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Medicare and Medicaid False Claims:
Prohibitions and Sanctions
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost*
Federal and state laws forbid health care professionals and in-
stitutions from engaging in a wide range of activities generally
referred to as Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse. Sections
of these laws prohibit an assortment of rebates, discounts, incen-
tives, joint ventures, and other profit-sharing arrangements, re-
ferred to as "bribes and kickbacks."1  Despite all of the
attention that has been given to the issue of bribes and kick-
backs, most Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse laws, crimi-
nal prosecutions, and administrative proceedings are brought
under other sections of the statute that involve false claims.
This article focuses on recent controversies and explores fraud
and abuse law as it affects false claims.
The term "false claims" includes bills submitted for services
that were not rendered, improperly coded, not provided by the
person who claimed to have provided them, or provided unnec-
essarily. Some cases that have resulted in false claims sanctions
have been quite bizarre. For example, a psychiatrist billed
Medicaid for 4800 hours in one year, a physician billed Medicaid
48 separate times for performing two abortions within a month
on the same patient, and a doctor billed Medicaid for treating a
22 year old college football player for diaper rash.2 Most, how-
ever, have involved more prosaic manipulation of codes and
padding of bills.
* Timothy Stoltzfus Jost is the Newton D. Baker, Baker & Hostetler Professor of
Law at The Ohio State University College of Law.
1. A General Accounting Office briefing report analyzing 279 cases referred from
the Office of the Inspector General to the Justice Department and closed during fiscal
years 1984 and 1985 found that 89 percent of the cases involved submission of false
claims. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD:
CHARACTERISTICS, SANCTIONS AND PREVENTION 2 (1987). A review of fraud and
abuse civil money penalty cases reported during 1989 found that all but one were
based on the false claims statute. Sanford V. Teplitzky & S. Craig Holden, 1989 De-
velopments in Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse, in 1990 HEALTH LAW HAND-
BOOK 433 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1990).
2. See Paul Jesilow et al., Fraud by Physicians Against Medicaid, 266 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 3318 (1991).
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With growing government concern over the rising cost of
health care, the elimination of false claims has become an in-
creasingly urgent priority of the federal and state governments.
A recent Government Accounting Office report asserts that
fraud and abuse may account for as much as 10 percent of the
$700 billion America spends on health care each year.3 The FBI
has reassigned 150 agents to investigate health care fraud, which
it identifies as one of its top three priorities in the area of white-
collar crime for the 1990s.4 The Health Care Financing Admin-
istration (HCFA) is in the process of creating fraud and abuse
units within companies that administer Medicare claims to
strictly enforce Medicare billing requirements. The states are
also continuing their efforts to prosecute Medicaid fraud and
abuse. This article examines false claims law, focusing in partic-
ular on emerging issues and controversies. 5
I. CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS
Federal statutes define a "claim" as "[a]ny application for
payments for items and services under" Medicare or Medicaid. 6
Knowingly or willfully misstating a material fact in a claim for a
benefit or payment under Medicare or Medicaid to determine
eligibility for such a benefit or payment is a felony, punishable
by up to five years imprisonment and a fine of up to $25,000.7 It
is also a felony to conceal knowledge of an event affecting a
person's right to a Medicare or Medicaid benefit or payment if
the event is concealed with the intent to secure the benefit or
payment by fraud; to apply for and receive a Medicare or Medi-
caid benefit or payment intended for the use of another and
3. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE, VUL-
NERABLE PAYERS LOSE BILLIONS TO FRAUD AND ABUSE (1992).
4. Brian McCormic, The Fraud Police, AM. MED. ASS'N NEWS, Oct. 12, 1992, at 1.
See also Joseph Ford, Investigating a National Problem Through a Global Strategy,
FED. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 66.
5. This article does not discuss provider strategies for dealing with fraud investiga-
tions. For two articles on this topic, see Manatt, Phelps, Phillips, & Kantor, When the
Institutional Health Care Provider is the Target of Federal Fraud and Abuse Proceed-
ings, FED. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 52, and Alan Reider & Harvey Yampolsky, Identifying
and Coping with Health Care Fraud Investigations, FED. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 62; see also
Alice G. Gosfield, Unintentional Part B False Claims: Pitfalls for the Unwary, in 1993
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 205 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1993) (discussing in detail
codes and procedures most likely to prompt fraud and abuse investigations).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(2) (1988). See also 42 C.F.R. § 1003.101 (1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The law also prohibits the
filing of false claims under Title V (maternal and child health block grant) and Title
XX (social services block grant) programs.
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then steal it; or to bill for a physician's service knowing that the
individual who provided the service was not a physician.8
Though criminal liability requires proof of intent-a "knowing"
or "willing" violation of the law-intent may be proved by a
conscious avoidance of an awareness of the falsity of claims or a
reckless indifference to the falsity of claims.9 If the person who
engages in one of these acts does not furnish medical items or
services (for example, a billing clerk), he or she or the person is
guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $10,000
and by imprisonment of up to one year.10 The law also imposes
criminal penalties for the knowing and willful violation of the
terms of a physician or supplier participation agreement or the
terms of a Medicare assignment of benefits agreement." In ad-
dition, false claims may violate federal laws prohibiting mail
fraud,12 the presentation of false claims to government agen-
cies,' 3 conspiracy to defraud the government, 4 and racketeer-
ing, ' 5 as well as state criminal laws.
While physicians, providers, and suppliers who violate these
provisions typically do so by billing for services that they did not
render, the statutes also prohibit upcoding services to receive a
higher reimbursement rate than is appropriate and falsely certi-
fying services as medically necessary. For example, in United
States v. Larm,6 the court upheld the conviction of an allergist
on seventeen counts of Medicaid fraud for billing nurse-admin-
istered allergy shots under CPT Code 90040,17 "brief examina-
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a).
9. United States v. Lennartz, 948 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Evans,
559 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1977). See Andrew Grosso, Prosecuting Health Care Fraud:
Tools of the Trade, FED. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 22 (discussing government strategies for
proving intent).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a).
11. Id. at § 1320a-7b(e).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. IV 1992).
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 (1988).
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 286, 287, 371 (1988).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO) statute permits, in addition to criminal penalties, forfeiture to the Un-
ties States of property derived from racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992). The United States government used RICO to seize the clinics, home,
automobiles, and yacht of a chiropractor convicted of mail fraud based on filing false
Medicare and insurance claims. United States v. Mayers, 957 F.2d 858 (M.D. Fla.
1988), noted in Sanford V. Teplitzky & S. Craig Holden, Medicare and Medicaid
Fraud and Abuse, in 1989 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 506 (Alice G. Gosfield ed.,
1989).
16. 824 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1078 (1988).
17. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT PROCEDURAL TERMINOL-
OGY MANUAL (the basis for CPT billing codes).
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tion, evaluation and/or treatment of same or new illness," rather
than CPT Code 90030, "minimal service: injections, minimal
dressings, etc., not necessarily requiring the presence of a physi-
cian." Other examples of fraudulent claims include bills submit-
ted for office visits when in fact the physician only provided a
telephone consultation; 18 multiple bills submitted for services
that should have been billed as a single office visit;19 services
claimed as performed under the supervision of a physician that
in fact were not;20 services claimed that were not provided, even
though in fact other services were provided;21 and bills submit-
ted for in office services to a woman bedridden at home.22
Cases that are prosecuted generally involve multiple false
claims, indicating a pattern of fraud and abuse.
False claims can be made either on paper or through elec-
tronic media. Currently about eighty percent of Medicare Part
A claims and forty-five percent of Part B claims are filed elec-
tronically, as are up to ninety percent of Medicaid hospital
claims and thirty-five percent of physician claims.23 The De-
partment of Health and Human Services and a variety of health
care reform plans advocate the increased use of electronic me-
dia for processing claims and payments. There has been some
concern that it may be difficult to prove that a false claim has
been knowingly or willfully made if no piece of paper signed by
the physician exists as a physical representation of the claim.
However, computer-generated records, properly authenticated
by a person who can explain how the data was created and
maintained and how printouts or other representations of the
data were generated, are generally admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the evidentiary rules of most states. 24 In-
18. United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1980).
19. State v. Quinn, 719 P.2d 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
20. Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Peterson v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
21. Id.; People v. Gregory, 266 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1014 (1990).
22. State v. Romero, 574 S.2d 330 (La. 1990).
23. See WORKGROUP FOR ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE, REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-
ICES (1992).
24. See FED. R. EVID. 1001-1008; SYSTEMS POLICY STAFF, JUSTICE MANAGEMENT
DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONI-
CALLY FILED FEDERAL RECORDS AS EVIDENCE (1991); ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMA-
TION & IMAGE MANAGEMENT, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINE FOR THE LEGAL
ACCEPTANCE OF RECORDS PRODUCED BY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS pt.
1 (1992).
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deed, one of the earliest criminal cases in which computer-gen-
erated records were accepted involved false health insurance
claims.25 Establishing that a physician or provider actually sub-
mitted an electronic claim that he or she denies filing might be
more problematic. In the analogous area of government con-
tracting, the Comptroller General has issued an opinion recog-
nizing the use of electronic signatures.2 6 However, one state
court has questioned the use of a presumption that a physician
has knowledge of an electronic claim filed by his office based on
the fact that he authorized in writing the filing of electronic
claims.
II. CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES
A person who submits false claims for payment under Medi-
care or Medicaid is also subject to civil sanctions, including mon-
etary penalties and exclusion from federal programs. The
Department of Justice enforces criminal fraud and abuse laws
and general civil fraud laws, and the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS) enforces fraud and abuse civil penalties, and pro-
gram exclusions specific to Medicare and Medicaid. In recent
years the OIG has aggressively enforced the fraud and abuse
laws with strong Congressional support. However, according to
an understanding between HHS and the Justice Department,
cases must first be referred to the Justice Department for crimi-
nal or civil action; the OIG pursues the claim only if the Justice
Department declines prosecution.28
Civil penalties for false claims can amount to $2000 per item
or service, plus assessments equaling twice the amount
claimed.29 A person is liable for civil penalties if he or she
"knows or should know" that a claim is false or that the service
was "not provided as claimed." The "not provided as claimed"
standard permits the imposition of penalties for miscoding as
25. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1157 (1974).
26. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, MATTER OF NATIONAL IN-
STITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY-USE OF ELECTRONIC DATA IN-
TERCHANGE TECHNOLOGY TO CREATE VALID OBLIGATIONS (1991).
27. People v. Freedland, 444 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
28. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Health and
Human Services and the Department of Justice Regarding Implementation of Section
1128A of the Social Security Act (1988).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(A) & (B) (1988). As with criminal sanctions, the
provisions apply to state programs funded through Title V and Title XX.
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well as for fictitious claims. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld a $258,000 penalty assessment against a physician
group despite arguments that the physicians had merely
"unartfully" described services rendered.30 The court stated:
"The standard of care imposed by this requirement is an exact-
ing one, and an 'unartful' description of medical services in a
Medicare claim is a description of services that were not pro-
vided as claimed." 31
The original civil sanctions statute, which imposed liability
under a "knows or has reason to know standard," created diffi-
culties for the government when a physician asserted, as is com-
mon, that the false claim was the fault of a billing clerk. For this
reason, Congress amended the statute in 1987 to create a
"knows or should know" standard, which is based on an objec-
tive evaluation of what a reasonable medical provider has rea-
son to know, not on what a particular provider admits to
knowing in fact.32 Under this amended standard, a medical pro-
vider can be found liable for submitting false or improper claims
if sufficient information came to the provider's attention to
place a reasonable provider on notice that the claims were ques-
tionable, or if a pre-existing duty required the provider to verify
the truth, accuracy, and completeness of the claims.33 The
"should know" standard subsumes reckless disregard for the
consequences of one's actions, as well as negligence in preparing
and submitting claims, whether done by the provider or some-
one under the provider's supervision.34 Congress also added a
new subsection stating that, "a principal is liable under this sec-
tion for the actions of the principal's agent acting within the
scope of the agency. ' 35 This subsection clarifies that physicians,
providers, and suppliers are liable for the acts of their employ-
ees. Thus, regardless of the amount of attention that physicians
actually pay to claims processing, they will almost always be lia-
30. Anesthesiologists Affiliated v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1991).
31. Id. at 681.
32. Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4118(e), 101 Stat. 1330-155 (1987).
33. Inspector General v. Anesthesiologists Affiliated, 1990 Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) T 38,554 (HHS Dept'l App. Board, Civ. Remedies Div. Feb. 5, 1990),
aff'd sub nom. Anesthesiologists Affiliated v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1991);
Inspector General v. Kern, 1990 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 38,389 (HHS
Dept'l App. Board, Civ. Remedies Div. Aug. 26, 1987).
34. 57 Fed. Reg. 3298, 3324 (1992). See also Mayers v. United States Dept. Health
& Human Servs., 806 F.2d 995 (11th cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); Anes-
thesiologists Affiliated, 1990 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 38,554.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(l) (1988).
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ble for civil sanctions if it is determined that their offices submit-
ted false claims.
The civil monetary penalty statute gives the OIG considerable
discretion in determining the amount of penalty to be assessed.
The statute and regulations list a variety of mitigating or aggra-
vating factors that the OIG may consider in determining the
amount of the penalty, including the amount and number of
false claims, the culpability of the person submitting the false
claim, any history of prior offenses, and the financial condition
of the person submitting the false claim.36 For example, in an
atypical case in which the OIG applied the maximum penalty,
the doctor had established a sophisticated scheme that enabled
him to submit bills for fictitious office visits and tests and to cre-
ate fictitious patient records to support the claims.37 In another
case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an assess-
ment of $1,791,100, based on receipt of $24,697.73, as justified
because of aggravating circumstances, including the fact that the
physician had submitted a large number of claims over a long
period of time.38
Absent mitigating factors, the amount assessed against one
who files a false claim should equal at least twice the amount of
damages and costs incurred by the United States government,
including costs incurred in the investigation, prosecution, and
administrative review of the case.39 The imposition of a penalty
substantially in excess of twice the amount of actual damages
may result in a punitive sanction, raising constitutional double
jeopardy problems in cases where a criminal penalty has already
been imposed.4°
In addition to the civil penalties that can be imposed under
the statute, civil penalties of $5000 per false claim plus assess-
ments of double the amount of the false claim can also be im-
posed under the federal Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of
1986. 1 Also, courts may impose penalties of between $5000 and
$10,000 per claim, plus treble damages for false claims.42 Under
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(d) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 1003.106 (1993).
37. Inspector General v. Vo & Thieu Du, 1989-2 Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 38,030 (HHS Dept'l App. Board, Civ. Remedies Div. Aug. 15, 1989).
38. Mayers, 806 F.2d 995. See also Chapman v. United States Dept. of Health &
Human Servs., 821 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1987) (civil penalties may exceed actual dam-
ages suffered by the government).
39. 42 C.F.R. § 1003.106(c)(3) & (d)(2).
40. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
41. 31 U.S.C. § 3802 (1988).
42. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988).
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the latter provision, a private citizen can bring a qui tam action,
and receive a percentage of the recovery as a bounty as well as
attorney's fees. 43
III. PROGRAM EXCLUSION
Exclusion from program participation, another remedy avail-
able to the OIG, will in many instances have a greater impact on
physicians than will civil penalties. If an individual is "ex-
cluded," Medicare and Medicaid will not pay for services ren-
dered by the excluded person or for services rendered by the
order of, or under the supervision of, an excluded person, re-
gardless of whether the claim in question is assigned or nonas-
signed.44 Thus, a hospital that provides services to a patient who
is admitted by an "excluded" physician cannot receive Medicare
payment for the stay unless it can show that it did not know or
have reason to know of the exclusion.45 The hospital may even
be liable for a civil penalty for submitting the claim.46
While civil money penalties and exclusion are both available
remedies for false claims, the purposes of the two types of sanc-
tion are different. Civil money penalties are imposed to make
the wrongdoer reimburse the government for costs that the gov-
ernment incurred because of the misconduct. Exclusion, on the
other hand, removes "untrustworthy" health care providers
from the program.
43. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) & (d) (1988). See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons,
Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (permitting a qui tam action in a Medicare as secondary payor case).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 704(b)(6), 1395u(j)(2), 1395y(e), 1396b(i)(2), 1397d(a)(9) (1988
& Supp. III 1991); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2 (1993). If a beneficiary submits a claim for
services provided by an excluded person, HCFA will pay the first claim and immedi-
ately notify the beneficiary that the person is excluded. It will not pay for services
provided more than fifteen days after the date of the notice. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1901(c)
(1993). Payment may also be made to patients admitted to a hospital before the ex-
clusion or hospice or home health agency patients receiving care under a plan or care
established before the exclusion for up to thirty days after an exclusion becomes ef-
fective unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that the exclu-
sion should take effect earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(c)(2)(B) (1988). Payments may
also be made under limited circumstances for emergency services rendered by ex-
cluded persons. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1901(c)(4). A physician or supplier who accepts an
"assigned" claim bills Medicare directly, as an assignee of the Medicare beneficiary.
A physician who accepts a Medicare patient on an "unassigned" basis, bills the pa-
tient, who in turn claims reimbursement from Medicare. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395u(b)(3)(B) (1988).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(e)(1)(B) (1988).
46. Id. at § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(D) (1988).
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One of the most common grounds for exclusion is conviction
of criminal Medicare or Medicaid fraud. Exclusion for at least
five years (and longer if there are aggravating circumstances) is
mandatory if a health care practitioner is convicted of a criminal
offense related to the delivery of an item or service reimbursed
under Medicare or a state health care program.47 Criminal con-
victions on which exclusion may be based are defined to include
not only guilty verdicts, but also guilty pleas, including nolo con-
tendere pleas, in which the defendant pleads no contest but does
not admit guilt, and Alford pleas, in which the defendant pleads
guilty but maintains innocence. 8 The fact that a conviction has
been expunged under state law does not hinder conviction-
based exclusion under federal law. Once a conviction is en-
tered, the defendant's guilt or innocence becomes irrelevant and
cannot be relitigated at the exclusion hearing. Although physi-
cians frequently argue in exclusion hearings that they pled guilty
to the criminal charge merely to avoid the expense and hassle of
a trial and in fact did nothing wrong, their earnest arguments are
uniformly rejected and mandatory five-year exclusions are regu-
larly imposed.
The exclusion provision also authorizes discretionary exclu-
sions, which can be triggered by a variety of circumstances, in-
cluding conviction of crimes involving fraud, theft,
embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duty, or other financial mis-
conduct, either in the delivery of health care in general or while
participating in a governmental program.4 9 The Secretary of
HHS may also exclude providers who file Medicare or Medicaid
claims that include charges or costs that substantially exceed the
usual claims or costs50 and providers who furnish health care to
any patient (whether or not eligible for services under Medicare
or a State health care program) that substantially exceeds the
patient's needs.51
47. Id. at § 1320a-7(a)(1) (1988).
48. Id. at § 1320a-7(i) (1988). See Hein v. Inspector General, 1993 Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) 41,366 (HHS Dept'l App. Board, Civ. Remedies Div. Feb.
26, 1993); James M. Becker et al., Avoiding Multiple Sanctions and Collateral Conse-
quences When Settling Fraud and Abuse Case, in 1993 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 187
(Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1993) (discussing settlement issues generally).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
50. Id. at § 1320a-7(b)(6)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). HHS declined to define
"usual charges" or "substantially in excess" stating that it will analyze billing patterns
on a case-by-case basis.
51. Id. at § 1320a-7(b)(6)(B) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
1994]
9
Jost: Medicare and Medicaid False Claims: Prohibitions and Sanctions
Published by LAW eCommons, 1994
Annals of Health Law
Regulations list aggravating and mitigating facts that the OIG
may consider in determining the length of the exclusion.5 2 How-
ever, they also attempt to cabin the OIG's discretion by estab-
lishing benchmarks for exclusion periods, which are binding
unless mitigating or aggravating factors dictate an exclusion of a
different length. 3 Although several administrative law judges
(ALJs) have held that these benchmarks are not binding on
ALJs reviewing OIG exclusion decisions, 4 HHS has recently
amended its regulations to clarify that the benchmarks bind not
only the OIG, but also ALJs, the Departmental Appeals Board,
and the federal courts.5 5 An alternative explanation for re-
jecting the application of the benchmark limits in ALJ hear-
ings-that refusal to consider all mitigating factors would result
in a punitive as opposed to a remedial sanction and thus violate
the double jeopardy prohibition-was rejected by the Depart-
mental Appeals Board in one of the Hanlester decisions. The
Appeals Board noted that statutory violations are prima facie
evidence of untrustworthiness, and that sanctions based on such
conduct are by definition remedial, even though they might also
serve incidental deterrent or punitive purposes.5 6
If the OIG excludes an individual or entity from participating
in the Medicare program, state Medicaid agencies must also ex-
clude that individual or entity from participating in Medicaid for
52. Aggravating factors that may be considered include the amount Medicare and
the state health care programs lost due to the claims or any other overbilling (with
losses above $1,500 considered aggravated); whether the acts or similar acts were
committed over a period of one year or more; the severity of the adverse impact on
the physical, mental, or financial welfare of program beneficiaries or others; and the
existence of a prior record of criminal, civil, or administrative sanction. 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.102(b) (1993). Mitigating factors that may be considered include a conviction
of three or fewer misdemeanors, a financial loss to Medicare and the state health
programs that is less than $1,500; a mental, emotional, or physical condition that re-
duced the individual's culpability; or cooperation with federal or state officials that
results in criminal conviction or civil penalties imposed against others for Medicare or
Medicaid fraud. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.102(c) (1993).
53. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.201(b) (1993) (three years for criminal fraud con-
viction), 1001.501(b) (1993) (not less than the time of suspension or revocation for
licensure actions).
54. See, e.g., Herlick v. Inspector General, 1992-2 Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) T 40,360 (HHS Dept'l App. Board, Civ. Remedies Div. May 11, 1992); Bar-
ranco v. Inspector General, 1992-2 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) T 40,246
(HHS Dept'l App. Board, Civ. Remedies Div. Mar. 30, 1992).
55. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1 (1993).
56. In re Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, Docket No. C-448, Decision
No. 1347 (HHS Dept'l App. Board, App. Div. July 24, 1992), aff'd, Hanlester v. Sulli-
van, 1993-1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 41,076 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 1993).
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the same period of time. However, states may request that an
exclusion from state health programs be waived. 8 Also, states
may, at their own initiative, exclude an individual or entity from
participating in Medicaid for any of the reasons that the individ-
ual or entity could have been excluded from participating in
Medicare under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7, or may impose exclusions
for longer periods of time than those imposed by the OIG.5 9
Under Executive Orders 12549 and 12689, Medicare exclusions
are given government-wide effect: the excluded individual or
entity is barred from participating in any other federal
program.60
In addition to the primary fraud and abuse civil penalty and
exclusion provisions, the Medicare and Medicaid statutes are
peppered with a large and growing number of other provisions
authorizing civil sanctions or exclusions for various improper
billing practices. These include violation of an assignment
agreement, billing in excess of limiting charges by nonparticipat-
ing physicians, or failure to use the claim form for submitting
claims.61 It is becoming increasingly common that a violation of
Medicare or Medicaid administrative regulations renders a phy-
sician subject to administrative sanctions, though in most in-
stances sanctions can only be imposed for knowing or willful,
and perhaps even repeated, violations.
IV. STATE REMEDIES
Although the federal fraud and abuse laws have garnered
much attention in recent years, the states have also been very
active in prosecuting Medicaid fraud and abuse. Most states
have statutes that specifically prohibit Medicaid fraud, though
some states rely on more general statutes that prohibit fraud or
theft by deception or false statements to public officials. 62 Stat-
utes prohibiting physicians or other medical providers from fil-
ing false claims or from obtaining payments through
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(d), 1396a(a)(39) (1988).
58. Id. at § 1320a-7(d)(3)(B).
59. Id. at §§ 1320a-7(d)(3)(B)(ii), 1396a(p)(1) (1988).
60. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1901 (1993).
61. Miscellaneous civil sanction authorities found in the Medicare and Medicaid
laws related to billing practices include 42 U.S.C. §§ 13951(h)(5)(D), (i)(6), (l)(5)(B),
(p), (r)(3)(B), 1395m(b)(5)(C), 1395u(b)(12)(C), (j)(1), (k)(1), (1), (m), (n), (p),
1395w-4(b)(3), (g)(1), (g)(3), (g)(4) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
62. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A, § 354 (West 1964); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 175.35 (McKinney 1988).
1994]
11
Jost: Medicare and Medicaid False Claims: Prohibitions and Sanctions
Published by LAW eCommons, 1994
Annals of Health Law [Vol. 3
misrepresentation are most common.63 Some statutes closely
track the federal law or some earlier version of it.64 A number
of states have prohibitions that supplement the federal law,65
such as forbidding the provision of unnecessary care 66 or care of
inadequate quality,67 prohibiting providers and practitioners
from charging Medicaid a fee that exceeds the lowest rate at
which they bill to the general public, 68 authorizing civil penal-
ties 69 or restitution 70 and suspension or termination from pro-
gram participation,7' permitting penalties double or triple the
amount falsely obtained,72 providing for forfeiture of profits or
property attributable to the offense,73 providing for the return of
improperly obtained payments plus interest, but without addi-
tional penalties if no intent to defraud is shown,7 4 and providing
for assessments to cover the cost of the investigation in addition
to any other penalties,75 which must usually be imposed through
63. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-83k (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 409.920 (West 1993); HAWAii REV. STAT. § 346-43.5 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:70.1 (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.607 (West 1988); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-13-13, -205, -213, -217 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 167, §§ 17-b, 61-a
(1990 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.40 (Anderson 1993).
64. See, e.g., 305 ILCS 5/8A-3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 230B
(1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-17 (West 1981).
65. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-44-5 (Michie 1989) (failure to retain records
documenting Medicaid claims for five years is a crime); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-
8.203(a)(3) (1990) (submitting claim for which provider has already received or
claimed reimbursement from another source is prohibited).
66. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-83k(a)(4) (West 1992) (performing
services not needed or without prior authorization, where required); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 409.913(8)(i) (West 1993) (furnishing inappropriate, unnecessary, or harmful goods
and services result in administrative sanctions only).
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.913 (inferior quality results in administrative
sanctions only); 305 ILCS 5/12-4.25(A)(e) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (termination for care
that is harmful or of "grossly inferior quality").
68. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1407(a)(8) (Supp. 1993).
69. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-55-108 (Michie 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 409.913 (West 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-13-225 (1993).
70. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-55-107 (Michie 1987).
71. See, e.g., id. at § 5-55-110 (1987) (for up to one year); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 409.913(a) (West Supp. 1993) (suspension for up to one year, termination for one to
twenty years); 305 ILCS 5/12-4.25 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (also authorizes withholding of
payments while proceeding is pending).
72. See, e.g., 305 ILCS 5/8A-7(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (triple damages plus $2000
per violation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5111.03 (Anderson 1993) ($2000 per claim
plus three times excess payments).
73. See, e.g., 305 ILCS 5/8A-3(d) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
74. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-17(f) (West 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5111.03(D).
75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.913(15); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-44-8(C)
(Michie 1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5111.03(B)(4); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56,
1007(A)(3) (West 1991).
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judicial proceedings.76 State statutes also permit revocation of
professional licensure based on Medicaid or Medicare fraud
convictions.7
CONCLUSION
In most states Medicaid pays physicians at levels well below
market rates. As the resource-based relative value scale78 is im-
plemented, it is likely that Medicare's reimbursement rate will
decline below the private charges of many physicians, with "bal-
ance billing ' 79 to the patient a very limited option. Under these
circumstances physicians may be tempted to manipulate codes,
submit multiple, fragmented bills for a single service, bill for
services not rendered, or provide services not medically neces-
sary.8° The anonymity of electronic billing might make these
practices even more attractive.
The false claims provisions of federal and state laws give the
Office of the Inspector General, the Department of Justice, and
state Medicaid Fraud Control Units an impressive arsenal of
remedies for responding to such practices. Although most false
claims probably go undetected, criminal convictions, civil mone-
tary penalties, and exclusion from program participation are the
consequences facing those who are caught. Pleas that improper
practices were the result of oversight or the fault of an employee
will seldom avail. Physicians convicted of Medicare and Medi-
caid fraud often serve little time in prison, but convictions are
regularly followed by civil money penalties or exclusions, or
even loss of licensure, which can have a devastating impact on
the physician's practice.
Compliance with the law, or at least attempted compliance,
renders the physician fairly secure from prosecution. Both crim-
inal and civil penalties can only be based on willful or knowing
violations of the law. Proof of intent or knowledge generally
requires repeated violations. A physician or provider who can
76. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-55-108 (1987); 305 ILCS 5/8A-7(c) (Smith-
Hurd 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 167, § 61 (1990). But see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 409.913(17) (authorizing administrative imposition of sanctions).
77. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(25)(Anderson Supp. 1992).
78. The resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) is a method of paying physi-
cians based on the value of their individual services rather than on their charges for
those services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (Supp. 111990).
79. A physician "balance bills" when he or she bills a patient a "balance" in excess
of the Medicare payment rate. Balance billing is strictly limited under RBRVS pay-
ment. Id. at § 1395w-4(g).
80. See Gosfield, supra note 5, at 205 (discussing false claims under RBRVS).
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demonstrate "due diligence" in attempting to code accurately
and supervise billing personnel is unlikely to be sanctioned,
even if a technical violation occurs.81 However, the physician or
provider who either consciously cuts too close to the line or fails
to pay attention to billing practice is courting disaster.
81. See Manatt, Phelps, Phillips, & Kantor, supra note 5 (discussing institutional
compliance programs).
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